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NOT INTERESTED? A TRUSTEE LACKS “PARTY
IN INTEREST” STANDING TO MOVE FOR AN
EXTENSION OF THE NONDISCHARGEABILITY
BAR DATE ON BEHALF OF CREDITORS
Stephen C. Behymer*
Chapter 7 bankruptcy is designed to provide a financially distressed
debtor with a “fresh start.” Towards that end, an individual debtor’s debts
are typically discharged during the case. A creditor has only a short
window of time in which to object to the dischargeability of its claims. This
bar date can only be extended for cause and upon the application of a
“party in interest.” Occasionally, a trustee will move for such an extension
on behalf of the creditors. There is a split, however, between the Fourth
and Sixth Circuits regarding whether a trustee is a “party in interest” and,
therefore, whether the trustee has standing to move for an extension.
This Note analyzes the trustee’s role and interests in a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case, as well as the policy interests underlying the U.S.
bankruptcy system. This Note concludes that a trustee is not a “party in
interest” because a trustee does not have a financial, practical, or
statutorily imposed interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt.
Therefore, this Note finds that the Fourth Circuit is correct in holding that
a trustee does not have standing to move for an extension of the
nondischargeability bar date.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a debtor who, experiencing financial hardship, can no longer pay
his creditors.1 After weighing his options, the debtor decides to file a
petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. In the typical
Chapter 7 case, the debtor’s assets will be sold and distributed to his
creditors, and the debtor will receive a discharge, “eliminat[ing] the
debtor’s personal liability for all debts not excepted from discharge.”2 The
deadline (the § 523 bar date) for each of his 350-plus creditors to file a
complaint challenging the dischargeability of the individual debts they are
owed (the nondischargeability complaint) is set for sixty days from the date
of the creditors’ meeting.3 Imagine further that some of the creditors sleep
on their rights by failing to timely file nondischargeability complaints or
apply for an extension of the § 523 bar date. Other creditors decide to rely
on the bankruptcy trustee, who is planning to move for an extension of the
§ 523 bar date on behalf of the creditors. On the morning of the § 523 bar
1. This hypothetical is loosely based upon the facts of In re Farmer, 786 F.2d 618 (4th
Cir. 1986).
2. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 700.01, 700.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2009).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) governs the procedure for objecting to the dischargeability of an
individual debt. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (2006). Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c),
which supplements 11 U.S.C. § 523(c), provides that “a complaint to determine the
dischargeability of a debt under § 523(c) shall be filed no later than sixty days after the first
date set for the meeting of creditors under [11 U.S.C.] § 341(a).” FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).
For a more thorough discussion of the procedure for objecting to the dischargeability of a
debt, see infra Part I.C.
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date, the bankruptcy trustee moves for an extension of the § 523 bar date on
behalf of all 350-plus creditors, seeking to give the creditors additional time
to object to the dischargeability of their claims.
Should the bankruptcy court grant the trustee’s application for an
extension? Or, did the creditors err in relying on the trustee to obtain an
extension? Should their claims be discharged for failure to comply with the
§ 523 bar date? The answers to these questions depend on whether the
trustee has standing to move for such an extension on behalf of the
creditors. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c) provides that only
a “party in interest” has standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar
date.4 But is a trustee a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c)? The Fourth
and Sixth Circuits disagree on this issue. The Fourth Circuit, in In re
Farmer, held that the bankruptcy trustee is not a “party in interest” under
Rule 4007(c).5 Conversely, in Brady v. McAllister, the Sixth Circuit held
that the bankruptcy trustee is a “party in interest” and, therefore, can move
for an extension of the § 523 bar date on behalf of creditors.6 This circuit
split has resulted in confusion among bankruptcy courts.7 The majority of
bankruptcy courts to address this issue have aligned with the Fourth Circuit
and held that a bankruptcy trustee is not a “party in interest” under Rule
4007(c).8 Still, some of these bankruptcy courts have used other equitable
powers to extend the § 523 bar date where a creditor reasonably relied on a
prior bankruptcy court order granting a trustee’s Rule 4007(c) motion.9
4. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).
5. In re Farmer, 786 F.2d at 620–21.
6. Brady v. McAllister, 101 F.3d 1165, 1170 (6th Cir. 1996).
7. Compare Silverdeer, LLC v. Deckelbaum (In re Deckelbaum), No. 10-06021-8-JRL,
2011 WL 5909331, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 17, 2011) (“The trustee is not a ‘party in
interest’ under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) and cannot extend the deadline for filing objections
to the discharge of specific debts under § 523.”), Ruben v. Harper (In re Harper), 194 B.R.
388 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (acknowledging case law that questions whether a trustee has
standing to move for an extension of a § 523 bar date, but nevertheless permitting the
creditor’s nondischargeability complaint to stand because the debtor failed to object to the
trustee’s motion for an extension of the § 523 bar date), Flanagan v. Herring (In re Herring),
116 B.R. 313 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990) (suggesting that a trustee is not a “party in interest,”
but nevertheless allowing the creditor’s nondischargeability complaint to stand because the
debtor did not appeal the court’s previous order granting an extension of the § 523 bar date),
and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Tatum (In re Tatum), 60 B.R. 335
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (holding that the trustee’s motion for an extension of time in which
to object to discharge does not extend the § 523 bar date on behalf of the creditors), with
Ellsworth Corp. v. Kneis (In re Kneis), No. 08-18014(DHS), 2009 WL 1750101 (Bankr.
D.N.J. June 15, 2009) (holding that a trustee does have standing to move for an extension of
the § 523 bar date on behalf of the creditors). See generally Frati v. Gennaco, No. 10-11055PBS, 2011 WL 241973, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 24, 2011) (acknowledging the split between the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, but assuming for the purposes of their analysis that a bankruptcy
trustee does have standing under Rule 4007(c)).
8. See, e.g., Silverdeer, LLC, 2011 WL 5909331, at *1; In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R.
685 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010); Ruben, 194 B.R. at 391–92 (using its equitable powers to
permit the creditors’ § 523 complaint to stand even though case law questions whether a
trustee is generally a party in interest); Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315; Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 60 B.R. at 338.
9. See Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315 (permitting a creditor’s § 523 complaint to stand
where the creditor relied on an unappealed order of the bankruptcy court extending the § 523

940

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Part I of this Note provides a background on bankruptcy law in the
United States, focusing on those portions of the Bankruptcy Code that are
relevant to the issue addressed by this Note: whether a trustee has standing
to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date on behalf of creditors. Part
II of this Note explores the Farmer and Brady decisions and the reasoning
of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits regarding whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
trustee has standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date on
behalf of creditors. Part II also discusses how bankruptcy courts have
responded to the Farmer and Brady decisions. Part III of this Note argues
that the Fourth Circuit was correct in concluding that a trustee is not a
“party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).10
I. SETTING THE STAGE: GROWTH OF THE CURRENT BANKRUPTCY CODE
AND AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 7 LIQUIDATION
This Note begins by providing a general background of the U.S.
bankruptcy laws, with a focus on Chapter 7 bankruptcies. Part I.A
discusses the history and development of the U.S. bankruptcy laws,
including the primary policy interests of the Bankruptcy Code. Part I.B
then provides a general overview of the structure of the current bankruptcy
laws. Next, Part I.C focuses its discussion more narrowly on Chapter 7
bankruptcies, with an emphasis on the procedure for determining the
dischargeability of an individual debt and the role of the bankruptcy trustee.
Part I.D concludes by looking at the use and interpretation of the phrase
“party in interest” throughout the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.
A. Understanding the Bankruptcy Code
This section briefly reviews the development of the U.S. bankruptcy
laws. It begins by exploring the history of bankruptcy in the United States
and the development of the current debtor-friendly system. This section
then discusses the two major policy interests that permeate the current
Bankruptcy Code.
1. History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States
Today, bankruptcy is defined as the “statutory procedure by which a . . .
debtor obtains financial relief and undergoes a judicially supervised
reorganization or liquidation of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of
creditors.”11 Bankruptcy laws have existed in America, in some form, since
bar date based upon the trustee’s application); see also Ruben, 194 B.R. at 391–92
(permitting the creditor’s nondischargeability complaint to stand because the debtor failed to
object to the trustee’s motion for an extension of the § 523 bar date).
10. While § 523 is applicable to the entire Bankruptcy Code—and therefore this issue is
relevant regardless of the type of relief sought under the Bankruptcy Code—this Note
focuses on § 523 within a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. There are two reasons for this. First,
this limitation will allow for a more refined and concrete exploration of the issues. Second,
most of the cases that address this issue, including both In re Farmer and Brady, were
Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases.
11. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 166–67 (9th ed. 2009).
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the early colonial era.12 The bankruptcy laws have not, however, always
looked as they do today. Over the past two and a half centuries, bankruptcy
in America has slowly transitioned from a collection of pro-creditor state
laws, which were largely unsympathetic to the plight of the financially
distressed debtor, to a more liberal federal system, which focuses on
providing the debtor with a “fresh start” while simultaneously facilitating
the fair and orderly collection of debts owed to creditors.13
During the colonial era, debtors were generally viewed as quasicriminals.14 Defaulting debtors could be imprisoned indefinitely, and
placed in jails alongside other criminals.15 In Pennsylvania, debtors were
subject to public flogging.16 In New York, debtors could be branded with a
“T,” designating them as thieves.17 Still, debtors were not without any
remedial measures. Some colonies and early states provided debtors with a
discharge, releasing the debtors from their obligations to repay their
outstanding debts.18 This form of relief was limited, however, and required
consent by a majority or supermajority of the debtor’s creditors, in number
and amount.19
Prior to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, bankruptcy laws were left
to the control and administration of the individual states.20 In fact, the
Articles of Confederation never mentioned bankruptcy.21 During the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, however, the Founding Fathers were
concerned with the lack of uniformity in the states’ administration of
bankruptcy laws, which resulted in a federal bankruptcy power.22 Article I,
12. See John E. Matejkovic & Keith Rucinski, Bankruptcy “Reform”: The 21st
Century’s Debtors’ Prison, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 473, 475–77 (2004).
13. See Uriel Rabinovitz, Note, Toward Effective Implementation of 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(11)(e): Invigorating a Powerful Bankruptcy Exemption, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521,
1531, 1534 (2009) (“[T]he current Bankruptcy Code is the product of historical evolution
that was at least two centuries in the making: what began as a tool to help creditors collect
debts has evolved into a mechanism granting relief to downtrodden debtors.”).
14. See, e.g., Matejkovic & Rucinski, supra note 12, at 476; Charles Jordan Tabb, The
History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 12
(1995).
15. Matejkovic & Rucinski, supra note 12, at 475.
16. GEORGE W. KUNEY, MASTERING BANKRUPTCY 4 (2008); Rabinovitz, supra note 13,
at 1528.
17. KUNEY, supra note 16, at 4; Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1528.
18. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 20.01[1].
19. John C. McCoid, II, The Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 361,
367–69 (1988). At the time of the American Revolution, four colonies authorized a limited
discharge from debt in their bankruptcy laws. Id. at 367. In New York, from 1788 to 1811, a
discharge required the consent of three-fourths of creditors. Id. at 368. In South Carolina, a
discharge required the consent of three-fourths of creditors in number and amount. Id. at
367. From 1749 to 1793, North Carolina authorized discharges to imprisoned debtors who
took an oath of poverty. Id. at 368. In addition, from 1756 to 1828, Rhode Island authorized
a discharge to all imprisoned debtors in exchange for surrendering their real and personal
property. Id. at 369.
20. See generally F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 33–66 (William
S. Hein & Co. 2002) (1919) (discussing various bankruptcy laws of the colonies and states
prior to the adoption of the Constitution).
21. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781; NOEL, supra note 20, at 67.
22. See Tabb, supra note 14, at 13.
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Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution, referred to as the “Bankruptcy
Clause,” authorizes Congress to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of
While this federal
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”23
bankruptcy power was only sporadically used before 1898, the few and
short-lived federal bankruptcy acts during the nineteenth century made
important strides in liberalizing bankruptcy in the United States into a more
debtor-friendly system.24
The first national bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,25
continued the creditor-oriented mindset of the colonial era.26 Under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800, bankruptcy was involuntary, meaning that only
creditors could initiate a bankruptcy case.27 Moreover, discharge under the
Act was limited to merchants, traders, bankers, brokers, factors,
underwriters, and marine insurers, and required two-thirds consent of the
creditors, by number and amount.28 Beginning in 1841, however, the
federal government began to enact more debtor-friendly bankruptcy
legislation.29 For example, the Bankruptcy Act of 184130 permitted debtors
to petition for voluntary bankruptcies.31 Moreover, the Bankruptcy Act of
1841 was not limited to traders and merchants; instead, any individual
debtor who was unable to repay his debts could petition for bankruptcy.32
In the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,33 Congress not only provided for voluntary
bankruptcy, but also eliminated the longstanding requirement of creditor’s
consent to a discharge, recognizing the importance of providing relief to a
financially distressed debtor.34 Today, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
197835 (the Bankruptcy Code), which established the current bankruptcy
system, is widely considered a “much more debtor-friendly law.”36

23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
24. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 20.01[2]; Rabinovitz, supra note 13,
at 1528–30.
25. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
26. See Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1529 (“The primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1800 was not to aid debtors, but rather to address attempts to defraud creditors.”).
27. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 2, 2 Stat. at 19, 21–22; see also Rabinovitz, supra note
13, at 1528.
28. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, §§ 1, 36, 2 Stat. at 20, 31; see also 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 20.01[2][a]; Tabb, supra note 14, at 15 (“Before a discharge
could be granted, the bankruptcy commissioners had to certify to the federal district judge
that the debtor had cooperated, and two-thirds of the creditors, by number and by value of
claims, had to consent to the discharge.”).
29. See Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1529–31.
30. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843).
31. Id. ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. at 440–41; see also Tabb, supra note 14, at 16–18.
32. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. at 440–41; see also McCoid, supra note 19,
at 361. While the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was not limited to merchants, corporations were
still excluded from seeking relief. Tabb, supra note 14, at 16–17.
33. ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
34. See id. ch. 541, §§ 4a, 14, 30 Stat. at 547, 550; Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1530
(“With this Act, Congress tried to make the discharge more readily attainable, eliminating
the requirement for creditors’ consent to a discharge.”).
35. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended in 11 U.S.C.). Congress has amended the Bankruptcy Code several times since
1978. E.g., Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
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This is not to suggest that the current Bankruptcy Code ignores creditors’
interests.37 Rather, the current Bankruptcy Code provides debtor-friendly
means of relief while simultaneously accounting for the interests of
creditors.38 This dual approach was apparent with the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 200539 (the
BAPCPA), which halted the pro-debtor trend, providing additional
protection for creditors to ensure that only those debtors in critical need
would be helped.40 Today, the current Bankruptcy Code focuses on
providing relief to honest debtors in need, while creating a system designed
to facilitate the orderly collection of debts owed to creditors.41
2. Policy Interests Underlying the Bankruptcy Code
The analysis of whether a bankruptcy trustee is a “party in interest” with
standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date requires
consideration of the policy interests underlying the current Bankruptcy
Code. This section discusses those two major policy interests.
As suggested in Part I.A.1, the Bankruptcy Code primarily serves two
important policy interests: (1) to provide the debtor with a fresh start, and
(2) to facilitate the fair collection of debts owed to creditors.42 Even though
353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.);
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1231);
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
36. Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1531 (quoting Personal Bankruptcy Consumer Credit
Crisis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of the American Bankruptcy Institute)); see
also Robert J. Landry, III & Nancy Hisey Mardis, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Debtors’
Prison Without Bars or “Just Desserts” for Deadbeats?, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 91, 95
(2006) (“Even though the Bankruptcy Code significantly changed substantive bankruptcy, it
did not alter the fundamental policy in favor of debtors. In fact, some argue that it enhanced
a policy in favor of debtors.”). For a more detailed discussion of the passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, see Tabb, supra note 14, at 32–37.
37. See KUNEY, supra note 16, at 4–5 (noting that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 “is a notable reversal” of the Bankruptcy Code’s debtorfriendly policy); Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1531.
38. See Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1531.
39. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
40. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005) (“The purpose of the
[BAPCPA] is to . . . ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”); see also
KUNEY supra note 16, at 4–5 (arguing that the BAPCPA is a “notable reversal of the more
liberal trend”); Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1531 (arguing that the BAPCPA takes into
account the interests of creditors).
41. See Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1531.
42. 1 HENRY J. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 2.3, at 17–18
(10th ed. 2012). See generally Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047–48 (1987) (discussing five policy interests in the
Bankruptcy Code: bankruptcy as a collection device, the bankruptcy discharge as a reward
to a worthy debtor, bankruptcy as a system to protect the interests of worthy creditors,
bankruptcy as a system to rehabilitate the debtor, and bankruptcy as a system “designed to
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early state and federal bankruptcy laws favored creditors, the interest in
providing a fresh start to the debtor dates back to the founding of the United
States.43 The Framers of the Constitution recognized that many debtors are
in such a position that they cannot escape or overcome their debts on their
own.44 The bankruptcy powers were granted under the Constitution, in
part, so that the federal government could order that “a cloak be made to
protect the debtor from the bitter winds of misfortune and the cruel assaults
of his creditor.”45
Today, the fresh start policy has grown into one of the most important
rationales underlying the bankruptcy system.46 According to the fresh start
theory, the aim of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide those individuals who
have suffered financial hardship with “a new opportunity in life . . .
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”47
The Bankruptcy code seeks to “allow the debtor to . . . resume being a
contributing member of society.”48 The fresh start policy requires a final
disposition of assets and claims against the debtor, so that the debtor can be
confident in his expectation for relief from financial distress.49
The fresh start policy does not, however, condone abuse by debtors.50
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated on multiple occasions that a fresh start

achieve economic efficiency in its allocation of the risk of loss . . . between debtor and
creditor”).
43. NOEL, supra note 20, at 7–8. But see Tabb, supra note 14, at 43 (“The idea of a
bankruptcy law as a means of providing a fresh start for distressed debtors was foreign to the
framers.”).
44. NOEL, supra note 20, at 7–8.
45. Id. at 8.
46. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S
234, 244 (1934); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225
(1986). But see Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh
Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 70 (2006) (arguing that Chapter 7 bankruptcy does not
rehabilitate many debtors sufficiently to provide them with a fresh start).
47. Local Loan Co., 292 U.S at 244.
48. Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1534.
49. See State Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Dunlap (In re Dunlap), 217 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.
2000) (“The strict time limitation placed upon creditors who wish to object to a debt’s
dischargeability reflects the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of providing debtors with a fresh
start.”); FDIC v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 120 F.3d 66, 69 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[Rule 4007(c)]
defines a time certain when creditors may no longer come claiming that the debtor defrauded
them and that certain debts should be non-dischargeable. . . . The debtor can relax.”);
Ichinose v. Homer Nat’l Bank (In re Ichinose), 946 F.2d 1169, 1172–73 (5th Cir. 1991).
50. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87. The BAPCPA introduced the rigid “means test” to
prevent abuse of the Bankruptcy Code by debtors who wanted to shirk the personal
responsibility of repaying their debts. See Lauren E. Tribble, Note, Judicial Discretion and
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act, 57 DUKE L.J. 789, 792 (2007) (arguing that it was a
“poor decision” for Congress to enact the “means test,” and proposing an alternative test).
Pursuant to the “means test,” a debtor’s ability to repay his or her loans is measured using an
objective formula “that produces a straightforward presumption or nonpresumption of abuse
of the bankruptcy process.” Kathleen Murphy & Justin H. Dion, “Means Test” or “Just a
Mean Test”: An Examination of the Requirement That Converted Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Debtors Comply with Amended Section 707(b), 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 413, 414
(2008).
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should only be granted to those debtors who have clean hands themselves.51
Accordingly, a debtor who has acted improperly may not be entitled to a
general discharge,52 or a bankruptcy court may determine that certain
improperly obtained debts are excepted from discharge.53
The second main function of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide for the
fair distribution of the debtor’s assets to the creditors.54 This fair collection
policy has a long history in bankruptcy law.55 In fact, the discharge was
originally incorporated into English bankruptcy laws in 1705 as a means to
encourage the debtor to cooperate in a bankruptcy case.56 Moreover,
bankruptcy laws were seen as a method of avoiding “‘grab law[s]’ with a
first-come, first-served characteristic, enabling the court to oversee an
orderly liquidation of the debtor’s assets.”57 Today, the fair collection
policy requires a prompt and orderly process of collection, liquidation, and
distribution of the debtor’s assets to the creditors.58 As such, the
Bankruptcy Code provides for a “ratable and equitable” distribution of a
debtor’s nonexempt assets to creditors according to a priority list
determined by Congress.59
B. The Structure of the Current Bankruptcy Laws: Code and Rules
Today, the current bankruptcy system is governed by the Bankruptcy
Code, found in Title 11 of the U.S. Code.60 The Bankruptcy Code is the
most important source of bankruptcy law in the United States.61 The
Bankruptcy Code is broken down into nine chapters, six of which provide
for some type of bankruptcy relief.62 Chapters 1, 3, and 5 contain laws that
are generally applicable to each of the six types of relief, including relevant
definitions,63 provisions regarding the administration of a bankruptcy case

51. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87 (“[The Bankruptcy Code] limits the opportunity for a
completely unencumbered new beginning to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’” (quoting
Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244)).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2006) (setting forth the circumstances in which a debtor is not
entitled to a discharge, including when the debtor has destroyed or concealed property with
intent to defraud).
53. Id. § 523(a) (providing that certain types of debts, including those obtained through
false pretenses or fraud, are nondischargeable).
54. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991); see also 1 SOMMER, supra note
42, § 2.3, at 17–18; Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1533.
55. Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1532.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1533.
58. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[1].
59. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2006) (setting forth the order of distribution of assets
in the bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case).
60. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended in 11 U.S.C.); see also 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 1.4.1.1, at 8–9.
61. See 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 1.4.1.1, at 8.
62. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[2] (noting that the chapters are
usually odd numbered to allow room for expansion in the Bankruptcy Code).
63. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–112; see also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶
1.01[2][a].
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between its commencement and closing,64 and provisions regarding
creditors’ claims and the claims process for each type of bankruptcy
relief.65 Chapter 1 also grants courts the power to “carry out the provisions
of this title” and gives courts the power to, “sua sponte, tak[e] any action or
mak[e] any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement
court orders or rules.”66
The Bankruptcy Code provides six forms of bankruptcy relief, referenced
according to their respective chapters therein.67 The three most common
forms of relief are Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13.68 Chapter 7
bankruptcy, the type of relief explored in this Note, governs the liquidation
of a debtor’s estate.69 In a Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor’s nonexempt
property is collected, liquidated, and then distributed among creditors
according to a priority scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.70 After
the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor typically receives a
general discharge, relieving him from the responsibility of repaying most of
his outstanding debts.71
Chapter 7 bankruptcy is the most common form of bankruptcy relief used
by individual debtors.72 The next most common form of bankruptcy relief
for the individual debtor is set forth in Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code.73 For qualifying individual debtors,74 Chapter 13 bankruptcy

64. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301–308, 321–333, 341–351, 361–366; see also 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[2][a].
65. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501–511, 521–528, 541–562; see also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[2][a]. The statute at issue in this Note, 11 U.S.C. § 523, is found in
Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
67. See 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 11:1 (3d ed. 2008).
68. Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1522–23. See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[1]. The three other types of bankruptcy relief are set forth in Chapters
9, 12, and 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 9 bankruptcy deals with the adjustment of a
municipality’s debt. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–904, 921–930, 941–946. Chapter 12 bankruptcy
governs relief for family farmers and fishermen. See id. §§ 1201–1208, 1221–1231. Lastly,
Chapter 15 governs international bankruptcies. See id. §§ 1501–1532.
69. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.01. For a more detailed discussion
of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, see infra Part I.C.1.
70. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.01. The order of distribution of
assets in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case is set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 726.
71. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶¶ 700.01, 727.01; see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 727 (governing the discharge in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case).
72. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.07[1]. In the twelve-month period
ending December 31, 2012, there were 816,271 “nonbusiness” Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petitions filed, compared to 363,280 “nonbusiness” Chapter 13 petitions. Table F-2, U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts—Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2012, U.S. CT.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2012/12
12_f2.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Table F-2].
73. See Table F-2, supra note 72.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) sets forth the minimum regular income requirements necessary
for an individual to qualify for Chapter 13 protection. This minimum dollar amount is
adjusted every three years “to reflect the change in the Consumer Price Index.” Id. § 104(a).
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provides bankruptcy court protection and supervision in creating a
repayment plan, taking into account the individual’s regular income.75
A financially distressed business typically petitions under Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.76 Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides for
the reorganization of a business.77 In a Chapter 11 case, the parties attempt
to come to an agreement regarding how to reorganize the company, rather
than simply liquidate it.78 The hope is that allowing the company to
continue to operate will generate greater value than liquidating the
company.79
The Bankruptcy Code works in conjunction with the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure (the Bankruptcy Rules), which were promulgated by
the Supreme Court in 1983.80 The Bankruptcy Rules govern the procedure
of cases brought forth under the Bankruptcy Code.81
C. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
This section looks specifically at bankruptcy relief governed by Chapter
7 of the Bankruptcy Code. First, this section provides an overview of a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Next, it explores the role and duties of the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee. Lastly, it discusses the strict nature of the
time limits in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.
1. Overview of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case
The ultimate goal of a Chapter 7 debtor is to obtain a fresh start by
seeking a general discharge of his or her debts.82 This is accomplished
through a liquidation procedure, managed by the Chapter 7 bankruptcy
trustee, and overseen by a bankruptcy court.83 In general, the debtor’s
assets are collected, liquidated, and then distributed to creditors according
to an order of priority set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.84 This subsection
will review in more detail the relevant procedure and laws of a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case.
The first step is the initiation of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.85 There
are two ways to commence a Chapter 7 case.86 The most common is a
75. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.07[5][d].
76. In the twelve-month period ending December 31, 2012, there were 27,274
“business” Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions filed, compared to 8,900 “business” Chapter 11
petitions. Table F-2, supra note 72.
77. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1100.01.
78. See Daniel R. Wong, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Cramdowns: Adopting a Contract
Rate Approach, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1927, 1931 (2012).
79. Id. at 1931–32.
80. See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1001.02[2]. The Supreme Court is
granted the power to prescribe bankruptcy rules pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006).
81. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 1.01[2][b].
82. 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 2.3, at 17–18.
83. See id.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (governing the priority scheme); Id. § 726 (setting forth the Chapter
7 distribution scheme); see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.01.
85. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.02.
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voluntary bankruptcy case in which the debtor, facing financial hardship,
chooses to file a Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy court.87 The second
method is an involuntary bankruptcy case in which the creditors file a
Chapter 7 petition.88
Once the case is initiated, either the U.S. trustee or the court appoints an
interim trustee,89 and the bankruptcy estate is created.90 The bankruptcy
estate, comprised of almost all of the debtor’s assets, is central to the
bankruptcy case because it is used to pay the creditors.91 Only assets that
are categorized as exempt are excluded from the bankruptcy estate.92 The
status of an asset—as exempt or nonexempt—is determined by 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(b). Under § 541(b), very few property interests are categorized as
exempt.93 Exempt assets include, inter alia, assets that a debtor controls for
the sole benefit of another94 and interests in certain income withheld by an
employer to be used in an employee health benefit plan.95 It is the duty of
the trustee to collect the nonexempt assets for the bankruptcy estate, and to
begin liquidating those assets for future distribution to the creditors.96
During the liquidation process, the trustee receives and reviews the
claims of the creditors.97 The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as a “right
to payment.”98 A debt is defined as “liability on a claim.”99 The two terms
are interconnected; a debtor owes a debt to a creditor, and a creditor has a
claim against a debtor.100 If the trustee believes that a claim is improper,
then the trustee may object to the claim.101 Once the bankruptcy estate has
86. Id. In addition to these two methods for initiating a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, a
case may also be converted to a Chapter 7 case from a Chapter 11, 12, or 13 case. Id.
¶ 700.02.
87. McCoid, supra note 19, at 361 (noting that voluntary bankruptcy is more common
than involuntary bankruptcy). In 2010, 99.92 percent of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases
filed were voluntary cases. See Table 7.2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Voluntary and
Involuntary Cases Filed, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. CT.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2010/Table702.pdf
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 303.
89. Id. § 701. Either the U.S. trustee or the court initially appoints the interim trustee.
Id. Subsequently, at the meeting of the creditors, the general unsecured creditors may elect a
permanent trustee. See infra note 108 and accompanying text; see also 11 U.S.C. § 702; 6
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 702.01.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 541; see also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.02.
91. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 541.01.
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 541.01.
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 541.01.
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1).
95. See id. § 541(b)(7).
96. Id. § 704(a)(1); 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 3.5.1, at 41.
97. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.04.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).
99. Id. § 101(12).
100. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 n.5 (1991).
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (“The trustee shall if a purpose would be served, examine
proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper.”). However, the
trustee is not always required to object to an improper claim. Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary
and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147,
176 (2006). In determining whether a trustee should object, “the inquiry is whether other
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been liquidated, and the deadline for filing claims has passed, the trustee
will distribute the estate in accordance with the distribution scheme set forth
in the Bankruptcy Code.102 First, secured creditors are entitled to payment
from the liquidation of the corresponding secured property, up to the
amount of the secured creditor’s claim.103 A secured creditor is “[a]
creditor who has the right, on the debtor’s default, to proceed against
collateral and apply it to the payment of the debt.”104 Then, unsecured or
undersecured105 creditors are paid as set forth under §§ 507 and 726, with
domestic support claims being paid first.106
While the trustee is collecting and liquidating the debtor’s nonexempt
assets, the bankruptcy court sends notice of the bankruptcy case to all of the
debtor’s creditors.107 The notice contains a date for the creditors’ meeting,
which is the creditors’ first opportunity to examine the debtor.108 In
addition, the court’s notice also contains certain deadlines, called bar dates,
including the bar date for objecting to the debtor’s general discharge, and
the bar date for filing nondischargeability complaints.109 Pursuant to
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a) and 4007(c), these bar
dates can be set no later than sixty days from the first date set for the
creditors’ meeting, regardless of whether the meeting actually takes
place.110 These bar dates can be extended by a court for cause upon a
motion by a “party in interest.”111

creditors would receive a greater distribution” if the objection was made. Id. Therefore, in
some situations the trustee might choose not to object if the trustee believes that the
administrative cost outweighs the benefit of objecting to the claim. See id.
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 507; id. § 726; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 726.01.
103. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.04; Chris Lenhart, Note, Toward a
Midpoint Valuation Standard in Cram Down: Ointment for the Rash Decision, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1821, 1824 (1998).
104. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 425.
105. A creditor is undersecured when the sale of the secured property is insufficient to
repay the full amount of the secured debt. See Lenhart, supra note 103, at 1824. The
undersecured creditor would be entitled to the full value of the secured property and then
would be treated as an unsecured creditor with regards to the outstanding portion of the debt.
See 11 U.S.C § 506(a).
106. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726. The term “domestic support obligation” is defined by
the Bankruptcy Code and includes alimony, maintenance, and support debts owed to “a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or
responsible relative” or owed to a governmental unit. Id. § 101(14A). It also includes any
interest that accrues on those debts. Id.
107. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.03.
108. 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 3.3, at 39. The meeting of creditors is governed by 11
U.S.C. § 341.
109. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 700.03. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 4007(c) requires the court to give at least thirty days’ notice of the § 523 bar date.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c). Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a) requires the
court to give at least twenty eight days’ notice of the bar date for objecting to the general
discharge. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a).
110. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a); id. R. 4007(c); see also Katherine S. Kruis, The Time
Limitation for Objecting to the Dischargeability of Debts: A Trap for the Unwary, 26 CAL.
BANKR. J. 55, 60 (2001).
111. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(b); id. R. 4007(c).
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After the bankruptcy estate is distributed, the court typically enters an
order of discharge, absolving the individual debtor from personal liability of
any remaining debts.112 A debtor is not, however, guaranteed a discharge
of all of his debts.113 There are primarily two ways in which an individual
debtor will not be relieved of the obligation to repay his remaining debts.114
First, the court may determine that the debtor is not entitled to a general
discharge.115 Second, the court may grant the general discharge but
determine that certain debts should be exempted from the discharge.116 The
following three paragraphs discuss the procedures for determining whether
a debtor is entitled to a general discharge and whether individual debts are
dischargeable.
First, a trustee, creditor, or U.S. trustee may object to the granting of a
discharge.117 The court will then determine whether the debtor is entitled to
a general discharge under § 727.118 Consistent with the fresh start
policy,119 the exceptions listed in § 727(a) are meant to ensure that only
honest debtors are able to take advantage of the bankruptcy laws.120 For
example, the bankruptcy court is required to deny the debtor a discharge if
the debtor fraudulently transferred or concealed assets in the year preceding
the filing of the petition,121 or the debtor failed to keep proper records of his
financial condition and business transactions.122 However, a denial of a
general discharge under § 727 is considered an “extreme penalty.”123 As
such, exceptions under § 727(a) are to be construed “liberally in favor of the
debtor.”124
Second, even if the bankruptcy court grants the debtor a discharge, the
court may determine that a specific debt is nondischargeable, meaning that
the debt is exempt from the discharge, and the creditor can go after the
postpetition assets.125 Section 523(a) governs whether a debt is exempt
from discharge.126 Most debts described in § 523(a) are automatically
exempt simply because they are a type of debt that Congress has decided

112. See 11 U.S.C. § 727; 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 3.6, at 47–48.
113. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 727.01[1].
114. See 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 15.1, at 451.
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 727.01[1].
116. See 11 U.S.C. § 523; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 523.01.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 727(c).
118. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 727.01[1]; see also 11 U.S.C. § 727
(governing Chapter 7 debtor’s entitlement to a discharge and setting forth the grounds for
denial of discharge).
119. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
120. See Irving Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Billings (In re Billings), 146 B.R. 431, 434
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).
122. Id. § 727(a)(3).
123. Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1534 (3d Cir. 1993).
124. Stamat v. Neary, 635 F.3d 974, 979 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing In re Kontrick, 295 F.3d
724, 736 (7th Cir. 2002)); Rosen, 996 F.2d at 1534.
125. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ¶ 523.01; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523
(governing the dischargeability of individual debts in a Chapter 7 case).
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 523.
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should survive through bankruptcy.127 These include, inter alia, taxes128
and domestic support obligations.129 Other debts require a hearing so that a
bankruptcy court can determine whether they are nondischargeable.130
These debts are described in § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6) and include, inter alia,
debts obtained through fraud131 or incurred through the willful and
Only a creditor can file a
malicious conduct of the debtor.132
nondischargeability complaint seeking a determination from the bankruptcy
court as to whether his claim is dischargeable under § 523(a)(2), (4),
or (6).133
The Bankruptcy Rules govern the procedure for objecting to the debtor’s
right to a discharge and determining the dischargeability of an individual
debt.134 Specifically, Rule 4004135 governs the procedure for objecting to a
discharge, and Rule 4007136 governs the procedure for determining the
dischargeability of an individual debt. As stated above, a creditor, trustee,
and U.S. trustee all have standing to object to the debtor’s discharge.137
Only the creditor can file a nondischargeability complaint.138 Under both
Rule 4004(a) and 4007(c), these objections must be filed within sixty days
from the first date scheduled for the creditors’ meeting.139 These bar dates
are strictly enforced; any motion filed after their expiration will be
denied.140 Yet both Rules 4004(b) and 4007(c) provide that any “party in
interest” can move for an extension of these bar dates as long as the motion
is filed before the expiration of the bar dates.141 Upon the motion of a
“party in interest,” the court may extend the deadlines for cause.142 As
Part II of this Note illustrates, there is a split between the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits regarding whether a bankruptcy trustee is a “party in interest” with
standing to move for an extension of the bar date for filing
nondischargeability complaints.143

127. Id. § 523(a).
128. Id. § 523(a)(1).
129. Id. § 523(a)(5).
130. Id. § 523(c).
131. Id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
132. Id. § 523(a)(6).
133. Id. § 523(c)(1).
134. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004 (governing the procedure for challenging a general
discharge); id. R. 4007 (governing the procedure for challenging the dischargeability of an
individual debt).
135. Id. R. 4004.
136. Id. R. 4007.
137. 11 U.S.C. § 727(c).
138. See id. § 523(c)(1).
139. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a); id. R. 4007(c); Kruis, supra note 110, at 60.
140. See Anwiler v. Patchett (In re Anwiler), 958 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1992).
141. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a); id. R. 4007(c).
142. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(b)(1); id. R. 4007(c).
143. See infra Part II.
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2. Strict Enforcement of the § 523(c) Time Limitations
This section focuses on the strict nature of the deadline for filing a
nondischargeability complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).
Rule 4007(c) supplements § 523(c) and provides that a
nondischargeability complaint must be filed within sixty days of the first
date set for the meeting of the creditors.144 This time limit is purposefully
short and strictly enforced in order to further the prompt administration of
the bankruptcy case and allow the debtor to obtain a fresh start
expeditiously.145
As the language of Rule 4007(c) indicates, the sixty-day time limit runs
from “the first date set for the meeting of creditors under § 341(a).”146 This
language has been interpreted to mean that the sixty-day time period runs
from the date the first meeting of the creditors is scheduled for, regardless
of whether the meeting of the creditors is actually held on that date.147
Therefore, if a meeting is scheduled and then adjourned, the § 523 bar date
is calculated based on the original date, not the adjourned date.148 This is
one example of the strict nature of the § 523 bar date.
While the § 523 bar date is strict, it may not be jurisdictional, meaning
that it could be waived by a debtor if the debtor fails to raise the
untimeliness of a nondischargeability complaint as an affirmative
defense.149 Currently, there is a split of authority as to whether the § 523
bar date is jurisdictional.150 If it is jurisdictional, then the court would be
powerless to consider an untimely nondischargeability complaint regardless
of whether the debtor raised the timeliness issue.151 While the Supreme
Court has not directly addressed this issue, it has stated that the similar bar
date under § 727 is not jurisdictional.152 Therefore, it is likely that the
§ 523 bar date is also not jurisdictional and can be waived by a debtor.153

144. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).
145. See Torrez v. Dickinson (In re Dickinson), No. 99-1506, 2000 WL 1761065, at *2
(10th Cir. Nov. 29, 2000) (stating that Rule 4007(c) serves an important purpose and must be
strictly enforced); State Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Dunlap (In re Dunlap), 217 F.3d 311, 316
(5th Cir. 2000); FDIC v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 120 F.3d 66, 69 (7th Cir. 1997); Kruis, supra
note 110, at 59 (stating that the § 523 bar date favors the debtor).
146. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).
147. DeLesk v. Rhodes (In re Rhodes), 61 B.R. 626, 629 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); Gatchell
v. Kise (In re Kise), 84 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Kruis, supra note 110, at 60.
148. See DeLesk, 61 B.R. at 629; Gatchell, 84 B.R. at 37.
149. 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 15.4.2, at 461.
150. Compare European Am. Bank v. Benedict (In re Benedict), 90 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that the § 523 bar date is not jurisdictional), with First Nat’l Bank in Okeene
v. Barnes, No. 91-6183, 1992 WL 33251, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 1992) (finding that Rule
4007(c) is jurisdictional), Dollinger v. Poskanzer (In re Poskanzer), 146 B.R. 125, 131
(D.N.J. 1992) (finding that the § 523 bar date is jurisdictional, and cannot be waived), and
Norwest Fin., Tex., Inc. v. Curtis (In re Curtis), 148 B.R. 465, 467 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992)
(finding that untimely nondischargeability complaint suffered from a jurisdictional defect).
151. Kruis, supra note 110, at 75–76.
152. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452–53 (2004) (“Only Congress may determine a
lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. . . . [T]he provision conferring jurisdiction
over objections to discharge, however, contains no timeliness condition. . . . The time
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In addition to the strict nature of the § 523 bar date itself, the rules
governing an extension of the bar date are restrictive; the § 523 bar date can
only be extended as provided for under Rule 4007(c).154 Generally, Rule
9006(a) permits a court to extend a time limitation under the Bankruptcy
Code after the deadline has expired if “the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect.”155 However, this equitable remedy is not applicable to
the § 523 bar date as Rule 9006(b)(3) further provides, “The court may
enlarge the time for taking action under Rule[] . . . 4007(c) . . . only to the
extent and under the conditions stated in [that] rule[].”156 Therefore, a
“party in interest” must either file a nondischargeability complaint or move
for an extension of the § 523 bar date before time expires; otherwise his
claim is subject to a general discharge.157
Adding to the confusion regarding Rule 4007(c), there is a split of
authority regarding whether “piggybacking” is allowed under Rule
4007(c).158 Piggybacking occurs when one party moves for, and is granted,
an extension on behalf of other nonmoving parties.159 Most courts
conclude that a “party in interest” may seek an extension of the § 523 bar
date on behalf of other creditors, but only if the movant specifically states
so in his moving papers.160
As illustrated, the § 523 bar date is strictly enforced. Failure to either
timely file a nondischargeability complaint or move for an extension of the
bar date will result in being barred from bringing a § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6)
complaint.161

constraints applicable to objections to discharge are contained in Bankruptcy Rules
prescribed by this Court.” (citations omitted)).
153. See generally 1 SOMMER, supra note 42, § 15.4.2, at 461.
154. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(3).
155. Id. R. 9006(b)(1).
156. Id. R. 9006(b)(3).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (2006).
158. Kruis, supra note 110, at 75; see also In re Pappas, 207 B.R. 379, 381–82 (B.A.P. 2d
Cir. 1997) (noting the lack of continuity in case law regarding whether the deadline to file a
nondischargeability complaint can be extended for multiple creditors based on the motion of
a single creditor). Compare Burger King Corp. v. B-K of Kansas, Inc., 73 B.R. 671, 673 (D.
Kan. 1987) (holding that the extension of time granted to two creditors did not enlarge the
time for a nonmoving creditor), with Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Watkins (In re Watkins), 365
B.R. 574, 577–78 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that the bankruptcy court can extend the
time for all creditors to file nondischargeability complaints based on the motion of a single
creditor).
159. Kruis, supra note 110, at 75.
160. See Kezelis & Kominiarek, P.C. v. Carlson (In re Carlson), 255 B.R. 22, 24 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2000); In re Floyd, 37 B.R. 890, 893 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that
creditors could not piggyback on a Rule 4007(c) motion made by another creditor because
they were not included in the motion); 3 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 67, § 57:72. But see
Burger King Corp., 73 B.R. at 673 (holding that the extension of time did not apply to a
nonmoving creditor).
161. See Torrez v. Dickinson (In re Dickinson), No. 99-1506, 2000 WL 1761065, at *2
(10th Cir. Nov. 29, 2000); State Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Dunlap (In re Dunlap), 217 F.3d 311,
316 (5th Cir. 2000); FDIC v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 120 F.3d 66, 69 (7th Cir. 1997).
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3. Role and Duties of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee
The ultimate issue of this Note, whether a trustee has standing under Rule
4007(c), depends on the interests of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee because
only a “party in interest” has standing.162 This section explores the roles
and duties of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee to provide insight into a
trustee’s interests.
A trustee plays an important role in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case as a
“representative of the [bankruptcy] estate.”163 As a representative of the
estate, a trustee has both fiduciary obligations and institutional
obligations.164 The trustee’s fiduciary obligations include the duty of
loyalty, which requires the trustee to be disinterested in the case and
prohibits the trustee from obtaining an interest adverse to the estate,165 as
well as the duties of due care, accountability, competence, and diligence.166
One of the most important fiduciary duties is the duty to maximize the
The duty to maximize
distribution of the bankruptcy estate.167
encompasses both the duty to maximize the value of the estate, as well as
the duty to minimize the estate’s administrative expenses.168 As the
Seventh Circuit has explained, “The performance of this duty will
sometimes require [the trustee] to forbear attempting to collect a particular
asset, because the costs of collection would exceed the asset’s value.”169
Related to the duty to maximize are the trustee’s duties to investigate the
financial affairs of the debtor170 and to examine and object to creditors’
improper claims.171 The purpose of the trustee’s duty to investigate is “to
amass information helpful to all creditors,”172 including ensuring that the
debtor discloses all of his property.173 Accordingly, the trustee undertakes
the duty to investigate in the interest of the creditors generally; in other
words, this duty is owed to the class of creditors, not to each individual
creditor.174 Similarly, the trustee undertakes the duty to examine claims in
the interest of the creditors as a class.175 Under the duty to examine claims,
a trustee is not necessarily required to object to an improper claim.176
162. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).
163. 11. U.S.C. § 323(a) (2006).
164. Rhodes, supra note 101, at 147.
165. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271–72 (1951); Rhodes, supra note 101, at
156.
166. Rhodes, supra note 101, at 172–76.
167. See In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 315 (7th Cir. 1995); Rhodes, supra
note 101, at 165.
168. Rhodes, supra note 101, at 165.
169. In re Taxman, 49 F.3d at 315.
170. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(4) (2006).
171. Id. § 704(a)(5).
172. In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. 685, 692 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010).
173. See In re Sebosky, 182 B.R. 912, 913 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
174. See In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. at 692 (“The chapter 7 trustee has neither the duty
nor the right to conduct an investigation designed only to aid a creditor in its individual
nondischargeability action.”).
175. See Rhodes, supra note 101, at 176.
176. See id.
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Rather, a trustee must determine whether objecting would increase the
distribution of the bankruptcy estate to the other creditors.177
Another important fiduciary duty of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is the
trustee’s duty of diligence.178 The duty of diligence requires the trustee to
“collect and reduce to money the property of the estate . . . as expeditiously
as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest.”179 This duty
relates to both of the major policy rationales underlying the Bankruptcy
Code as discussed in Part I.A.2: the interest in providing the debtor with a
fresh start and the interest in facilitating the fair and orderly collection of
debts owed to creditors.180
Contrary to the fiduciary duties stated above, the trustee does not owe his
institutional obligations to the parties of the bankruptcy case.181 Instead,
they are separate duties derived directly from the Bankruptcy Code.182
Institutional obligations are “established to protect the integrity of the
bankruptcy process.”183 The most prominent institutional obligation is the
trustee’s duty to oppose the debtor’s discharge, if advisable.184 The
purpose of the duty to oppose the discharge is to deter future debtors from
neglecting or ignoring their bankruptcy obligations, and to punish debtors
who have acted improperly.185 Notably, while the trustee has a duty to
object to the debtor’s discharge, if advisable, the trustee is not assigned a
duty to object to the dischargeability of individual debts.186
D. Use of the Phrase “Party in Interest” Throughout
the Bankruptcy Code and Rules
This section analyzes the use of the phrase “party in interest” as it is used
throughout the Bankruptcy Code and Rules. This analysis will provide
insight into whether a trustee is a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “party in interest.”187 This is
because the phrase is an elastic concept.188 Who is considered a “party in

177. See id.
178. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006).
179. Id.
180. See supra Part I.A.2.
181. Rhodes, supra note 101, at 148.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 203; see also Jacobson v. Robert Speece Props., Inc. (In re Speece), 159 B.R.
314, 320 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993) (“Preservation of the integrity of the bankruptcy system
. . . is one reason the court is empowered to order the case trustee to examine whether any
ground exists to deny discharge.”).
184. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(6).
185. See Jacobson, 159 B.R. at 320; Rhodes, supra note 101, at 207.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(6).
187. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3rd Cir. 1985); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101
(defining many of the terms used in the Bankruptcy Code, but not “party in interest”).
188. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 747–49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); see In re
Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1042; Chalgren v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re
Chalgren), No. 09-56729 ASW, 2011 WL 4753528, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011)
(“The term party in interest is meant to be elastic, and whether a party is a party in interest is
determined by the facts of the case.”).
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interest” may change based upon where the phrase is used in the
Bankruptcy Code or Rules, because the meaning depends on the
individual’s interest in the particular proceeding.189 A party may have an
interest in one part of a bankruptcy case, but not another part of that same
case.190 As this section will illustrate, an individual is generally considered
a “party in interest” only if they have a financial interest, practical stake, or
some other interest in the proceeding.191
Occasionally, when the phrase “party in interest” is used in the
Bankruptcy Code or Rules, the specific statute or rule will provide a list of
certain individuals who are to be considered “parties in interest.”192 For
example, in Chapter 11, the Bankruptcy Code defines a “party in interest”
as “including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity
security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any
indenture trustee.”193 When these lists are provided, courts have interpreted
them to be nonexhaustive lists of who should be considered a “party in
interest” under that particular statute or rule.194
A review of the circuit court decisions interpreting the phrase “party in
interest” as it is used throughout the Bankruptcy Code and Rules reveals
that an individual is considered a party in interest only if he has a financial
interest, a practical interest, or some other interest in the outcome of the
particular proceeding.195 The Third Circuit, in In re Amatex Corp., held
that future asbestos victims were “parties in interest” entitled to have a
voice in the Chapter 11 reorganization of an asbestos manufacturer.196 The
Third Circuit specifically noted that whether or not future claimants have
claims in the bankruptcy case is immaterial because they “clearly have a
practical stake in the outcome of the proceedings.”197 The Third Circuit
stated that in order to determine whether an individual is a “party in
interest,” courts must inquire “on a case by case basis whether the
prospective party in interest has a sufficient stake in the proceeding.”198
In determining whether an individual is a “party in interest,” the Second,
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have focused on whether the individual’s

189. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1042.
190. See id.
191. See Nintendo Co. v. Patten (In re Alpex Computer Corp.), 71 F.3d 353, 356–57
(10th Cir. 1995); Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee (In re Hutchinson), 5 F.3d 750,
756 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that the term “party in interest” is “‘generally understood to
include all persons whose pecuniary interests are directly affected by the bankruptcy
proceeding’” (quoting White Cnty. Bank v. Leavell (In re Leavell), 141 B.R. 393, 399
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992)); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1041–42 (finding that future
asbestos victims were “parties in interest” because they had a “practical stake in the outcome
of the proceedings”).
192. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1109(b), 1121(c).
193. Id. §§ 1109(b), 1121(c).
194. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1042.
195. See Nintendo Co., 71 F.3d at 356–57; Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co., 5 F.3d at
756; In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1042.
196. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1042–43.
197. Id. at 1041.
198. Id. at 1042.
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financial interests are directly affected by the bankruptcy proceeding.199
The Fourth Circuit, in Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee, found
that the owners and lienholders of a dairy farm were “parties in interest”
with respect to the bankruptcy auction of the farm, because they “had a
pecuniary interest in its sale.”200 The Second Circuit, however, has
clarified that the financial interest must be direct, and that a “party in
interest” is the party with the legal right which is sought to be enforced or
the party entitled to bring suit.201 The Second Circuit, in Krys v. Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Refco, Inc., found that the creditor’s
investors were not “parties in interest” because, while they had a financial
interest in the creditor, they did not have a direct financial interest in the
bankruptcy proceedings.202 Ultimately, as the previous cases illustrate, an
individual cannot constitute a “party in interest” unless he has at least some
interest in the proceedings, whether it is financial or practical.203
II. CONFLICT BETWEEN CIRCUITS: WHY THE FOURTH AND SIXTH
CIRCUITS DISAGREED ON TRUSTEES’ STANDING UNDER RULE 4007(C)
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, it is vital that a creditor abide by the time
limitation established for filing a nondischargeability complaint.204 If a
creditor fails to file a timely nondischargeability complaint, the creditor will
be barred from bringing a § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) challenge to the
dischargeability of his claim.205 In other words, the creditor will be barred
from arguing that the debt he is owed is a nondischargeable debt acquired
by the debtor via fraud, embezzlement, or larceny, or created as a result of a
willful or malicious injury.206 Therefore, it is imperative that a creditor
with a § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) claim either file a timely nondischargeability
complaint or obtain an extension of the § 523 bar date.207
Currently, there exists a split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
regarding who constitutes a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c) with
standing to move for such an extension.208 Specifically, these circuits are

199. See Krys v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Refco Inc. (In re Refco Inc.),
505 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 2007); FutureSource LLC v. Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281, 284 (7th
Cir. 2002) (stating that a “party in interest” is anyone holding a direct financial stake in the
outcome of the proceeding); Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co., 5 F.3d at 756.
200. Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co., 5 F.3d at 756.
201. Krys, 505 F.3d at 117 (citing Roslyn Sav. Bank v. Comcoach Corp. (In re Comcoach
Corp.), 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983)).
202. Krys, 505 F.3d at 117.
203. Nintendo Co. v. Patten (In re Alpex Computer Corp.), 71 F.3d 353, 356–57 (10th
Cir. 1995); Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co., 5 F.3d at 756; In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d
1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985).
204. See supra Part I.C.2.
205. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c); supra note 161 and accompanying text; see also
Moody v. Bucknum (In re Bucknum), 951 F.2d 204, 205 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming the
dismissal of a nondischargeability complaint filed after the § 523 bar date expired).
206. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
207. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c); supra note 161 and accompanying text.
208. Compare In re Farmer, 786 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1986), with Brady v. McAllister (In re
Brady), 101 F.3d 1165 (6th Cir. 1996).
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split as to whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee has standing to move for
an extension on behalf of creditors.209 The Fourth Circuit, in In re Farmer,
concluded that bankruptcy trustees are not “parties in interest” because they
do not have a statutory duty related to, or financial interest in, the
dischargeability of an individual debt.210 Conversely, the Sixth Circuit, in
Brady v. McAllister, concluded that a bankruptcy trustee is a “party in
interest.”211 The Brady court based its conclusion on the broad definition
of the phrase “party in interest,” concerns for administrative efficiency, and
because the trustee’s general duties give the trustee an interest in the
dischargeability of individual debts.212
This circuit split has resulted in confusion and inconsistent application of
Rule 4007(c) in the lower bankruptcy courts. The majority of bankruptcy
courts to address this issue have aligned with the Fourth Circuit and
concluded that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is not a “party in interest.”213
Nevertheless, a few of these courts have simultaneously employed equitable
powers to permit a creditor’s untimely § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) challenge to
stand where the creditor reasonably relied on a bankruptcy court’s order
granting an extension based upon the trustee’s application.214
This Part of the Note first discusses the Fourth Circuit’s decision in In re
Farmer and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brady v. McAllister. This Part
will then explores some of the bankruptcy court decisions that have
followed, specifically focusing on the equitable remedies that a few of these
courts have employed to account for the creditor’s belief that the trustee had
standing under Rule 4007(c) to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date
on behalf of the creditors.

209. See Brady, 101 F.3d at 1167; In re Farmer, 786 F.2d at 621.
210. See In re Farmer, 786 F.2d at 620–21.
211. See Brady, 101 F.3d at 1171.
212. See id. at 1169–71.
213. Compare Silverdeer, LLC v. Deckelbaum (In re Deckelbaum), No. 10-06021-8-JRL,
2011 WL 5909331, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 17, 2011) (“The trustee is not a ‘party in
interest’ under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) and cannot extend the deadline for filing objections
to the discharge of specific debts under § 523.”), In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. 685 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 2010), In re Cooper, Nos. 02-03566, 03-00235, 2003 WL 1965711 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa Apr. 7, 2003), Ruben v. Harper (In re Harper), 194 B.R. 388, 391–92 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1996) (acknowledging case law that questions whether a trustee has standing to move for an
extension of a § 523 bar date), Flanagan v. Herring (In re Herring), 116 B.R. 313, 315
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990) (suggesting that a trustee is not authorized to seek an extension of
time for filing objections to the dischargeability of individual debts), and Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Tatum (In re Tatum), 60 B.R. 335, 338 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1986) (holding that the trustee’s motion for an extension of time in which to object to
discharge does not extend the § 523 bar date on behalf of the creditors), with Ellsworth Corp.
v. Kneis (In re Kneis), No. 08-18014(DHS), 2009 WL 1750101, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.J. June
15, 2009) (holding that a trustee does have standing to move for an extension of time on
behalf of the creditors).
214. See Ruben, 194 B.R. at 391 (using its equitable powers to permit the creditors’ § 523
complaint to stand even though case law questions whether a trustee is generally a party in
interest); Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315 (permitting a creditor’s § 523 complaint to stand where
the creditor relied on an unappealed order of the bankruptcy court extending the § 523 bar
date based upon the trustee’s application).

2013]

NOT INTERESTED?

959

A. The Fourth Circuit Held That a Bankruptcy Trustee Is Not a “Party in
Interest” Under Rule 4007(c)
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit court to address whether a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is a “party in interest” with standing to move
for an extension of the § 523 bar date on behalf of creditors.215 In In re
Farmer, the Fourth Circuit held that the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee was
not a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c) because the trustee did not have
a statutory duty related to, or a financial interest in, the dischargeability of
the individual debt.216
In In re Farmer, Elma Speight Farmer and Mary Alice Parker Farmer
(the Farmer debtors) filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition after being sued
in federal court on allegations of securities and investment fraud.217 The
bankruptcy court set the § 523(c) deadline for creditors to file
nondischargeability complaints as October 4, 1984.218 Thereafter, the
trustee moved twice, pursuant to Rule 4007(c),219 for an extension of this
bar date.220 The bankruptcy court granted the first extension without
opposition.221 The Farmer debtors opposed the trustee’s second extension
request, however, arguing that the trustee was not a “party in interest”
entitled to request such an extension under Rule 4007(c).222 Nevertheless,
the bankruptcy court granted the second extension.223
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, denying the second extension
request.224 The Fourth Circuit held that a bankruptcy trustee is not a “party
in interest” under Rule 4007(c) and therefore does not have standing to
move for an extension of time on behalf of the creditors.225 In rendering its
conclusion, the court acknowledged that the meaning of “party in interest”
varies depending upon where the phrase is used in the Bankruptcy Code
and Rules.226 An individual may be a “party in interest” with regards to
one part of a bankruptcy case, and not a “party in interest” with regards to
another part of the case.227 According to the Fourth Circuit, under Rule
4007(c) a “party in interest” is limited to those parties who either have (1) a
statutory duty related to, or (2) financial interest in the dischargeability of
an individual debt “sufficient to justify seeking an extension on behalf of
215. See In re Farmer, 786 F.2d at 621.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 619.
218. Id.
219. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c) provides that “[o]n motion of a party
in interest, after hearing on notice, the court may for cause extend the time” for filing
complaints under § 523(c) in a Chapter 7 liquidation. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).
220. In re Farmer, 786 F.2d at 619.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. The In re Farmer court’s opinion did not elaborate on the bankruptcy court’s
reasoning, only stating that the bankruptcy court “granted the trustee’s request for an
extension of time, holding that the trustee was a ‘party in interest.’” Id.
224. Id. at 621.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 620.
227. See id.
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the creditor.”228 The court concluded that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee
does not satisfy either of these criteria, and therefore cannot move for an
extension of the § 523 bar date.229
In the first part of its opinion, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a trustee
does not have any statutory duty that would give him an interest in the
dischargeability of an individual debt and make him a “party in interest”
under Rule 4007(c).230 Rather, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a
trustee’s statutory duties do make him a “party in interest” under a Rule
4004(b) application.231 The Fourth Circuit explained that a trustee has
standing to object to a general discharge under § 727.232 Therefore, under
Rule 4004(b), which supplements § 727 and sets forth the time limits for
objecting to a general discharge, a trustee “would clearly be a ‘party in
interest’ to seek time extensions under 4004(b).”233 However, a trustee has
no corresponding standing to object to the dischargeability of an individual
debt under § 523.234 Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, under Rule
4007(c), which supplements § 523, a trustee lacks any statutory duty that
would give him an interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt.235
In addition, the Fourth Circuit rejected trustee-appellee’s argument that
the difference in language between § 523 and the corresponding Rule
4007(c) necessarily implies that a trustee is a “party in interest” under Rule
4007(c).236 The appellee’s argument proceeded as follows: § 523 only
gives “creditors” the right to object to the dischargeability of an individual
debt. Rule 4007(c) uses a broader phrase, “any party in interest,” in
describing who can move for an extension of the § 523 bar date. Therefore,
because the phrase “party in interest” includes more than just creditors, it
must also include the trustee.237 The Fourth Circuit readily dismissed this
argument, suggesting that the phrase “party in interest” can be broader
without necessarily including the trustee.238 As the Fourth Circuit
continued, a creditor may have a successor in interest who would not be a
“creditor” under § 523, but could have an interest sufficient to be a “party in
interest” under Rule 4007(c).239 The Fourth Circuit concluded, “Allowing a
party who shares a community of interest with a creditor to offer a 4007(c)
motion does not . . . extend that privilege to the trustee.”240
Next, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a trustee’s general duties to
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor and to assist in the

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id. at 620–21.
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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administration of the bankruptcy case do not give the trustee an interest in
extending the § 523 bar date.241 The Fourth Circuit stated that the trustee’s
general duties to investigate and to assist, set forth at 11 U.S.C. § 704,
cannot give the trustee the power that the trustee is specifically denied
under § 523.242 Put differently, a trustee’s general duties are insufficient to
make the trustee a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c) because the trustee
was already denied the specific duty to object to the dischargeability of an
individual debt under § 523.243 In addition, the Fourth Circuit stated that
permitting the trustee to request extensions under Rule 4007(c) does not
enhance the trustee’s ability to carry out these general duties.244 The Fourth
Circuit did state, however, that a trustee may still investigate the
circumstances surrounding individual debts to the extent that the
circumstances may affect the debtor’s right to a general discharge.245
Nevertheless, having an interest in the circumstances surrounding
individual debts does not give the trustee an interest in the dischargeability
of an individual debt.246
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the trustee has no financial
interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt.247 It stated, “‘The
trustee acts for all the creditors so as to maximize the distribution from the
[bankruptcy] estate,’”248 and further noted, “‘A nondischargeable debt is
not satisfied from the estate to the detriment of the other creditors.’”249
Rather, a creditor holding a nondischargeable debt can recover from
postpetition assets.250 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a
trustee, having no financial interest in postpetition assets, has no financial
interest in the dischargeability of an individual complaint.251 Accordingly,
a trustee is not a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).252
There exists some confusion among the bankruptcy courts regarding the
accuracy of the Fourth Circuit’s financial interest analysis in In re Farmer.
This disagreement centers on the Fourth Circuit’s statement that “‘[a]
nondischargeable debt is not satisfied from the estate to the detriment of the
other creditors.’”253 Some courts have criticized the In re Farmer decision
as relying on the mistaken presumption that creditors holding
nondischargeable debts can only recover from postpetition assets and do not

241. Id. at 621.
242. Id.
243. See id. (“The investigatory responsibility granted in 11 U.S.C. § 704 cannot give the
trustee power that another portion of the Code denies.”).
244. See id. (“[W]e fail to see how permitting the trustee to file 4007(c) motions enhances
his ability to investigate or assists in the administration of an admittedly complex case.”).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 620–21.
248. Id. at 621 (quoting In re Overmyer, 26 B.R. 755, 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
249. Id. (quoting Overmyer, 26 B.R. at 758).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. Id. (quoting Overmyer, 26 B.R. at 758).
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share in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate.254 In In re Owen-Moore,
however, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California
maintained that the In re Farmer court “was correctly referring to the
portion of a nondischargeable claim paid exclusively from non-estate assets
after the chapter 7 trustee fulfills his statutory obligations to liquidate and
distribute estate assets to creditors.”255
B. The Sixth Circuit Held That a Bankruptcy Trustee Is a
“Party in Interest” Under Rule 4007(c)
The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Brady v. McAllister,
explicitly rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s holding in In re Farmer.256 In
Brady, the bankruptcy court below set the § 523 bar date for filing
nondischargeability complaints as July 21, 1992.257 On July 20, 1992, the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee moved for and received an extension of the
§ 523 bar date, extending the time for creditors to file nondischargeability
complaints to October 21, 1992.258 On October 20, 1992, creditor Donald
T. McAllister filed a complaint alleging that his $40,000 claim against the
debtor was nondischargeable.259 In response, the debtor moved to dismiss
McAllister’s § 523 complaint as untimely.260 The bankruptcy court denied
the debtor’s motion to dismiss, explaining that its previous order extended
the § 523 bar date for all creditors, including McAllister.261 The debtor
appealed this decision.262
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the trustee had
standing under Rule 4007(c) to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date
on behalf of all creditors.263 The Sixth Circuit based its decision on four
factors.264 First, while Rule 4007(a) only permits creditors and debtors to
file a nondischargeability complaint, Rule 4007(c) more broadly provides
that “any party in interest” can move for an extension of the § 523 bar
date.265 Second, the Brady court suggested that a trustee does have an
economic interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt.266 Third,

254. Brady v. McAllister (In re Brady), 101 F.3d 1165, 1170 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Myers,
168 B.R. 856, 861 (Bankr. D. Md. 1994).
255. In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. 685, 689 n.3 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that the
In re Farmer court’s language could be clearer, but nevertheless basing its interpretation on
a careful reading of the In re Farmer court’s economic interest analysis).
256. Brady, 101 F.3d at 1170.
257. Id. at 1167.
258. Id.
259. Id. The Brady opinion did not explain the basis of McAllister’s nondischargeability
complaint.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1168. The debtor first appealed to the Western District of Kentucky. Id. The
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. Id.
263. See id. at 1171.
264. See id. at 1169–71.
265. Id. at 1170.
266. See id. The Brady court did not explicitly conclude that a trustee has an economic
interest in obtaining an extension of the § 523 bar date; rather, the Brady court suggested this
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giving trustees standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date
promotes the administrative efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings.267
Fourth, the trustee has a duty to investigate the financial affairs of a debtor
and therefore should be considered a “party in interest.”268 Based on these
four factors, the Sixth Circuit held that a trustee was a “party in interest”
under Rule 4007(c) with standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar
date.269
This section will further explore each of the arguments presented by the
Brady court. First, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the plain language of Rule
4007 and concluded that standing to move pursuant to Rule 4007(c) for an
extension of the § 523 bar date is not restricted to those parties who have
standing to file a § 523 nondischargeability complaint.270 As the Brady
court indicated, the phrase “any party in interest,” as used in Rule 4007(c),
is broader than the language used in Rule 4007(a), which provides that only
creditors and debtors may file nondischargeability complaints.271 The
Brady court reasoned that if the phrase “any party in interest” was similarly
limited to debtors and creditors, it would render the difference in phrasing
meaningless.272 Therefore, “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c) is not
limited to creditors and debtors. 273
Second, the Sixth Circuit criticized the In re Farmer court’s conclusion
that a trustee has no economic interest in obtaining an extension of time for
creditors to file nondischargeability complaints.274 According to the Sixth
Circuit, the In re Farmer court’s analysis was based on the erroneous
presumption that nondischargeable debts are only paid out of the
postpetition assets.275 However, “‘nondischargeable debts do share in
estate distributions pro rata with dischargeable debts of the same class.’”276
In other words, creditors with nondischargeable debts can recover from
both the distribution of the bankruptcy estate and from the postpetition
assets.277 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit suggested that a trustee does have a
financial interest in a nondischargeable debt to the extent that the debt will
be recovered from the distribution of the bankruptcy estate.278
conclusion by criticizing the In re Farmer court’s conclusion that a trustee has no economic
interest in obtaining an extension of the § 523 bar date. Id.
267. Id. (“Depriving the trustee of standing to secure additional time for creditors to file
nondischargeability complaints could undermine the efficient administration of bankruptcy
proceedings.”).
268. See id. at 1171.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 1170.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id. The Brady court noted that the Farmer court itself acknowledged that “the
inability to file a nondischargeability complaint does not preclude the ability to request
additional time to file such a complaint.” Id.; see supra note 238 and accompanying text.
274. Brady, 101 F.3d at 1170.
275. Id.; see supra note 254 and accompanying text.
276. Brady, 101 F.3d at 1170 (quoting In re Myers, 168 B.R. 856, 861 (Bankr. D. Md.
1994)).
277. See id.
278. See id.
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Third, the Sixth Circuit stated that the court’s interest in promoting the
efficient administration of bankruptcy proceedings supports its conclusion
that a trustee is a “party in interest” with standing to seek an extension of
the § 523 bar date.279 The court explained that Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases
may have hundreds or thousands of creditors who may have suffered “from
an elaborate scheme of consumer or securities fraud by the debtor.”280
Therefore, the court further stated that it is impractical to have each creditor
file an individual motion seeking an extension of time to file a
nondischargeability complaint.281 Instead, allowing the trustee to file a
single motion on behalf of every creditor would decrease the financial
burdens and increase the speed of bankruptcy proceedings.282 Moreover,
the Sixth Circuit stated that this would not unnecessarily delay the
bankruptcy case because the creditors must still make a showing of
entitlement to the extension.283
Lastly, the Brady court concluded that the trustee’s general duty to
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor, laid out in 11 U.S.C. § 704,
further supported its conclusion that a trustee has standing under Rule
4007(c).284 In rendering this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit again criticized
the Fourth Circuit, stating that the In re Farmer court was misguided in
concluding that this general duty cannot “‘give the trustee power that
another portion of the Code denies.’”285 The Sixth Circuit explained its
criticism, stating that the very issue at hand was whether the Code or Rules
in fact deny the trustee standing.286
C. Bankruptcy Courts’ Responses to the In re Farmer and Brady Decisions
Currently, there is confusion among the bankruptcy courts as to whether
a trustee is a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c) because of the split
between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.287 In fact, some bankruptcy courts
have initially granted a trustee’s Rule 4007(c) motion, only to subsequently
reverse course within the same case and side with the Fourth Circuit.288
While the majority of bankruptcy courts to address this issue have

279. See id.
280. Id. at 1170–71.
281. Id. at 1171.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See id.
285. Id. (quoting In re Farmer, 786 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1986)).
286. Id.
287. See Frati v. Gennaco, No. 10-11055-PBS, 2011 WL 241973, at *2–3 (D. Mass. Jan.
24, 2011) (acknowledging the split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits); In re OwenMoore, 435 B.R. 685, 688 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010) (stating that the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits have come to “widely divergent results” regarding whether a trustee is a
“party in interest” under Rule 4007(c)).
288. See Ruben v. Harper (In re Harper), 194 B.R. 388 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996); Flanagan v.
Herring (In re Herring), 116 B.R. 313, 315 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Tatum (In re Tatum), 60 B.R. 335, 338 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
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ultimately aligned themselves with the Fourth Circuit,289 a few of these
courts have nevertheless employed equitable remedies to avoid having to
dismiss untimely § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) complaints where a creditor
reasonably relied on a bankruptcy court’s previous order granting an
extension of the § 523 bar date based upon the trustee’s application.290 This
subsection briefly reviews the equitable remedies employed by these courts,
and discusses their hesitation in dismissing these untimely complaints.
In Flanagan v. Herring, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Georgia agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in In re
Farmer, but nevertheless permitted a creditor’s § 523 complaint to stand,
because the creditor had relied on an unappealed order of the bankruptcy
court extending the § 523 bar date.291 In Flanagan, the bankruptcy court
initially granted the trustee’s Rule 4007(c) motion, extending the § 523 bar
date for all creditors.292 The debtor did not appeal this order.293 Then, after
the initial bar date, but before the expiration of the new bar date, the
creditor filed a § 523 complaint challenging the dischargeability of his
claim.294 The debtor moved to dismiss this complaint as untimely because
it was made after the initial § 523 bar date had expired.295 The court denied
the debtor’s motion.296 In doing so, the bankruptcy court agreed with the
Fourth Circuit’s analysis in In re Farmer and acknowledged that the trustee
was not a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).297 Nevertheless, the court
declined to dismiss the untimely § 523 complaint, suggesting that the debtor
waived his right to object to the timeliness of the § 523 complaint by failing
289. Compare Silverdeer, LLC v. Deckelbaum (In re Deckelbaum), No. 10-06021-8-JRL,
2011 WL 5909331, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 17, 2011) (“The trustee is not a ‘party in
interest’ under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) and cannot extend the deadline for filing objections
to the discharge of specific debts under § 523.”), In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. at 688, In re
Cooper, Nos. 02-03566, 03-00235, 2003 WL 1965711, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 7,
2003), Ruben, 194 B.R. at 392 (acknowledging case law that questions whether a trustee has
standing to move for an extension of a § 523 bar date), Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315
(suggesting that a trustee is not a “party in interest,” but nevertheless allowing the creditor’s
§ 523 complaint to stand because the debtor did not appeal the court’s previous order
granting an extension of the § 523 bar date), and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 60 B.R. at 338 (holding that the trustee’s motion for an extension of time in which to
object to discharge does not extend the § 523 bar date on behalf of the creditors), with
Ellsworth Corp. v. Kneis (In re Kneis), No. 08-18014(DHS), 2009 WL 1750101, at *3
(Bankr. D.N.J. June 15, 2009) (holding that a trustee does have standing to move for an
extension of time on behalf of the creditors).
290. See Ruben, 194 B.R. at 392 (acknowledging case law that questions whether a
trustee has standing to move for an extension of a § 523 bar date, but using its § 105
equitable powers to allow the complaint to stand); Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315 (suggesting
that a trustee is not a “party in interest,” but nevertheless allowing the creditor’s § 523
complaint to stand because the debtor did not appeal the court’s previous order granting an
extension of the § 523 bar date).
291. Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315.
292. Id. at 314.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 315.
297. Id. (“This court does not disagree with the analysis of the Fourth Circuit in
Farmer.”).
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to appeal the erroneously granted extension.298 Accordingly, the court in
Flanagan held that a § 523 complaint should not be dismissed where a
creditor relied upon an unappealed order of the court.299
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina issued a
similar order in Ruben v. Harper, declining to dismiss an untimely § 523
complaint where the creditor relied upon an unappealed order of the court
granting an extension.300 The Ruben court indicated that this equitable
power derives from 11 U.S.C. § 105.301 It stated that under § 105, the court
is required to allow a creditor’s complaint to stand where the creditor
reasonably relied upon an unappealed order of the bankruptcy court.302
Consequently, while the majority of the courts ultimately side with the
Fourth Circuit in concluding that trustees are not “parties in interest” under
Rule 4007, the inconsistent interpretation of Rule 4007 has led some
bankruptcy courts to employ these equitable remedies to avoid dismissing
untimely § 523 complaints where the creditor relied upon a previous court
order granting an extension.
III. WHY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT
Under Rule 4007(c), only a “party in interest” has standing to move for
an extension of the § 523 bar date for filing a nondischargeability
complaint.303 As Part I.D illustrated, the phrase “party in interest” is
generally interpreted to include those individuals who have some interest in
the particular proceeding, whether it be a financial interest, a practical
interest, or some other interest.304 Because the interpretation rests on the
individual’s interests in the particular proceeding, who is considered a
“party in interest” can vary depending upon the specific statute or rule in
which the phrase is used.305 An individual may have an interest with
regards to one proceeding within a bankruptcy case, but not an interest with
regards to another proceeding within the same case.306 Accordingly, as it is
used in Rule 4007(c), a “party in interest” includes those parties who have a
(1) financial, (2) practical, or (3) statutorily imposed interest in the
dischargeability of an individual debt.307 Part III argues that a bankruptcy
trustee does not have any interest in the dischargeability of an individual
debt. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit was correct in determining that a
bankruptcy trustee was not a “party in interest” with standing to move for
an extension of the § 523 bar date.
298. See id.; see also supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text (discussing whether a
debtor can waive the § 523 bar date).
299. Flanagan, 116 B.R. at 315.
300. Ruben v. Harper (In re Harper), 194 B.R. 388, 391, 396 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996).
301. Id. at 392; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the power
granted to courts under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006)).
302. Ruben, 194 B.R. at 392.
303. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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Part III.A argues that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is not a “party in
interest” under Rule 4007(c) because a bankruptcy trustee does not have an
interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt sufficient to give the
trustee standing to move for an extension of the § 523 bar date on behalf of
creditors. Part III.B argues that this conclusion is consistent with the freshstart policy interest of the Bankruptcy Code.
A. A Bankruptcy Trustee Is Not a “Party in Interest” Under Rule 4007(c)
First, the Fourth Circuit was correct in concluding that a bankruptcy
trustee does not have a financial interest in the dischargeability of an
individual debt sufficient to be a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).308
A trustee has a financial interest in those aspects of a bankruptcy case that
affect the collection, liquidation, and distribution of the bankruptcy estate.
This financial interest stems from the trustee’s role in managing the
distribution of the bankruptcy estate to unsecured and undersecured
creditors.309 In this role, the bankruptcy trustee has a duty to maximize the
distribution of the bankruptcy estate, including both the duties to maximize
the value of the bankruptcy estate and to minimize the administrative
expenses.310 The dischargeability of a claim, however, does not affect the
collection, liquidation, and distribution of the bankruptcy estate. This is
because both a dischargeable and nondischargeable debt are treated the
same way during the distribution of the bankruptcy estate; that is, both will
be reimbursed according to the priority list set forth in the Bankruptcy
Code.311 Where a dischargeable debt and a nondischargeable debt differ is
after the completion of the distribution of the estate, when a
nondischargeable debt is still able to be collected from the postpetition
assets.312 Since the dischargeability of an individual debt does not affect
the collection, liquidation, and distribution of the bankruptcy estate, and
does not affect the trustee’s duty to maximize the distribution of the estate,
the trustee has no financial interest in whether or not the debt is
dischargeable.313 As such, the bankruptcy trustee fails the first prong of the
“party in interest” test because the trustee does not have a financial interest
in the dischargeability of an individual debt.314
308. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 249, 255, 277 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 249, 255, 277 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 249, 255, 277 and accompanying text.
314. The Sixth Circuit, in Brady v. McAllister, erred in suggesting that a trustee has a
financial interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt. See Brady v. McAllister (In re
Brady), 101 F.3d 1165 (6th Cir. 1996). In rendering its opinion, the Sixth Circuit merely
critiqued the In re Farmer court’s financial interest analysis instead of providing support for
its own conclusion. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. However, the Brady court
accurately stated that nondischargeable debts share in the distribution of the estate with
dischargeable debts. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. As indicated in the text
accompanying notes 309–12, this supports the conclusion that dischargeability of a debt does
not affect the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, and as such, the trustee has no financial
interest in the dischargeability of a debt.
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Second, the Fourth Circuit was correct in concluding that a bankruptcy
trustee does not have a statutorily imposed interest in the dischargeability of
an individual debt.315 Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits agreed that an
individual has a statutorily imposed interest in the dischargeability of an
individual debt if that individual has standing to file a nondischargeability
complaint.316 Yet both circuits also correctly noted that a trustee does not
have standing to file a nondischargeability complaint.317 Therefore, a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee does not have a statutorily imposed interest in
the dischargeability of an individual debt under § 523.318 Conversely, a
trustee does have a statutorily imposed interest in the debtor’s right to a
general discharge because § 727 gives standing to the trustee to object to
the general discharge.319 In fact, § 704(a)(6) specifically makes it the duty
of the trustee to object to the granting of a general discharge, if
advisable.320 Therefore, a trustee would be a “party in interest” under Rule
4004(a), which corresponds to § 727, with standing to move for an
extension of the bar date for objecting to the general discharge.
Third, a bankruptcy trustee does not have a practical interest in the
dischargeability of an individual debt. An individual has a practical interest
in a proceeding if they have a sufficient stake in the outcome of that
proceeding.321 None of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee’s general duties,
however, are affected by, or dependent upon, the determination of whether
a debt is dischargeable.322 Therefore, the trustee does not have a practical
interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt sufficient to make the
trustee a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).323
For instance, under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5), the trustee has a duty to
review and, if necessary, object to any claim made against the bankruptcy
estate.324 Yet this duty requires the trustee to investigate the validity of a
claim to determine if the claim can partake in the distribution of the
bankruptcy estate; the duty does not have anything to do with whether that
claim will be discharged after the estate has been distributed.325 Therefore,
the trustee’s duty to review claims does not give the trustee a practical
interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt.326

315. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 236–40, 270–73 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 237–38, 271 and accompanying text.
318. While the Sixth Circuit was correct in noting that a “party in interest” under Rule
4007(c) is not limited to those individuals with standing to file § 523 complaints, it erred in
suggesting that the broader language of Rule 4007(c) implies that a trustee is a “party in
interest.” See supra note 272 and accompanying text. Instead, an individual still needs some
interest in the dischargeability of an individual debt to be considered a “party in interest.”
See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 117, 137 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Part I.C.3.
323. See supra notes 191, 307 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 97–101, 175–77 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.

2013]

NOT INTERESTED?

969

Similarly, the Sixth Circuit erred in concluding that the trustee is a “party
in interest” under Rule 4007(c) because of the trustee’s general duty to
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor.327 A trustee’s § 704(a)(4)
duty to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor is not affected by
whether an individual debt is determined to be dischargeable and, therefore,
does not give the trustee a practical interest in the dischargeability of an
individual debt.328 The purpose of a trustee’s duty to investigate is “to
amass information helpful to all creditors.”329 As such, this duty must be
undertaken in the interest of all of the creditors; it does not permit a trustee
to investigate matters that do not affect the creditors as a class.330
Therefore, similar to the trustee’s duty to review claims, the § 704(a)(4)
duty to investigate does not include a duty to investigate the
dischargeability of an individual debt, and does not serve as a basis for
making a trustee a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).
However, as the In re Farmer court suggested, the § 704(a)(4) duty to
investigate does not necessarily prohibit a trustee from investigating the
circumstances surrounding individual debts.331 For example, the trustee
may investigate the circumstances surrounding individual debts if they may
affect the debtor’s right to a general discharge.332 Nevertheless, the trustee
is only concerned with the individual debts to the extent that they weigh in
on the availability of a general discharge or otherwise affect the class of
creditors.333 The trustee is not interested in whether the individual debts
themselves are dischargeable.334
Lastly, the Sixth Circuit erred in suggesting that the use of the broad
phrase “party in interest” in Rule 4007(c), as compared to the use of the
narrower language “debtor or creditor” in Rule 4007(a), implies that a
trustee is a “party in interest” under Rule 4007(c).335 As both the Fourth
and Sixth Circuits indicated, the difference in language does suggest that
the phrase “party in interest” is not limited to just debtors and creditors.336
As the Fourth Circuit stated, however, the phrase “party in interest” can be
broader without necessarily including the trustee.337 For example, in In re
Overmyer, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York held that a Chapter 7 creditor’s parent company was a “party in
interest” even though the parent company was neither a creditor nor
debtor.338 The use of the broad language does not, by itself, imply that a

327. See supra notes 170–74, 284–86 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 175, 245 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 270–73 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 238, 273 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
338. See In re Overmyer, 26 B.R. 755, 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also supra note
238 and accompanying text.
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trustee is a “party in interest.”339 Instead, the trustee needs some interest in
the particular proceedings.340 Therefore, because the trustee does not have
a financial, practical, or statutorily imposed interest in the dischargeability
of an individual debt, the trustee is not a “party in interest” under Rule
4007(c).
B. Consistency with the Fresh-Start Policy Interest
of the Bankruptcy Code
This Note’s conclusion that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is not a “party
in interest” under Rule 4007(c) is consistent with the fresh-start policy
interest underlying the Bankruptcy Code. As the Supreme Court has stated,
“The various provisions of the bankruptcy act . . . are to be construed when
reasonably possible in harmony with . . . the general purpose and policy of
the act.”341 This consistency provides further support that a trustee is not a
“party in interest” under Rule 4007(c). As discussed in Part I.A.2, one of
the primary goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to “allow the debtor to get out
from under the weight of his debt and resume being a contributing member
of society.”342 Under the fresh-start theory, the Code aims to provide the
debtor with both finality and certainty as to his expectations for relief from
financial distress.343 In fact, the short sixty-day bar date under Rule
4007(c) is supposed to limit delays in providing the debtor with a fresh
start, regardless of the potentially harsh consequences of the short bar
date.344 However, permitting the trustee to be a “party in interest” runs
counter to this fresh-start theory. Allowing the trustee to extend the § 523
bar date will delay the case, potentially providing many creditors with
additional time to file nondischargeability complaints when they otherwise
may have been barred from doing so.345 This delays, and potentially
hinders, the ability of the debtor to get out from under the weight of its
debt.346 Therefore, the fresh-start policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code
further supports the conclusion that a trustee is not a “party in interest”
under Rule 4007(c).
CONCLUSION
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ disagreement in their interpretations of
Rule 4007(c) has created confusion among the bankruptcy courts and
parties to a bankruptcy case as to whether a trustee can move for an
extension of the § 523 bar date. First, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a
trustee does not have standing under Rule 4007(c). Then, the Sixth Circuit
explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit and came to the opposite conclusion.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
Rabinovitz, supra note 13, at 1534; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46, 342 and accompanying text.
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However, this Note’s analysis of the meaning of the phrase “party in
interest,” and the trustee’s lack of interest in the dischargeability of a debt,
illustrate that the Fourth Circuit’s decision was the better-reasoned opinion.
A trustee does not have a financial, practical, or statutorily imposed interest
in the dischargeability of an individual debt sufficient to be a “party in
interest” under Rule 4007(c).

